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2.1 Introduction
Recent research on the causes of the Great Depression has laid much of the
blame for that catastrophe on the doorstep of the international gold standard.
In his new book, Temin (1989) argues that structural flaws of the interwar gold
standard, in conjunction with policy responses dictated by the gold standard's
"rules of the game," made an international monetary contraction and deflation
almost inevitable. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) have presented evidence that
countries which abandoned the gold standard and the associated contraction-
ary monetary policies recovered from the Depression more quickly than coun-
tries that remained on gold. Research by Hamilton (1987, 1988) supports the
propositions that contractionary monetary policies in France and the United
States initiated the Great Slide, and that the defense of gold standard parities
added to the deflationary pressure.
1
The gold standard-based explanation of the Depression (which we will
elaborate in section 2.2) is in most respects compelling. The length and depth
of the deflation during the late 1920s and early 1930s strongly suggest a mon-
etary origin, and the close correspondence (across both space and time) be-
tween deflation and nations' adherence to the gold standard shows the power
of that system to transmit contractionary monetary shocks. There is also a
high correlation in the data between deflation (falling prices) and depression
(falling output), as the previous authors have noted and as we will demonstrate
again below.
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If the argument as it has been made so far has a weak link, however, it is
probably the explanation of how the deflation induced by the malfunctioning
gold standard caused depression; that is, what was the source of this massive
monetary non-neutrality?
2 The goal of our paper is to try to understand better
the mechanisms by which deflation may have induced depression in the
1930s. We consider several channels suggested by earlier work, in particular
effects operating through real wages and through interest rates. Our focus,
however, is on a channel of transmission that has been largely ignored by the
recent gold standard literature; namely, the disruptive effect of deflation on the
financial system.
Deflation (and the constraints on central bank policy imposed by the gold
standard) was an important cause of banking panics, which occurred in a
number of countries in the early 1930s. As discussed for the case of the United
States by Bernanke (1983), to the extent that bank panics interfere with nor-
mal flows of credit, they may affect the performance of the real economy;
indeed, it is possible that economic performance may be affected even without
major panics, if the banking system is sufficiently weakened. Because severe
banking panics are the form of financial crisis most easily identified empiri-
cally, we will focus on their effects in this paper. However, we do not want to
lose sight of a second potential effect of falling prices on the financial sector,
which is "debt deflation" (Fisher 1933; Bernanke 1983; Bernanke and Gertler
1990). By increasing the real value of nominal debts and promoting insol-
vency of borrowers, deflation creates an environment of financial distress in
which the incentives of borrowers are distorted and in which it is difficult to
extend new credit. Again, this provides a means by which falling prices can
have real effects.
To examine these links between deflation and depression, we take a com-
parative approach (as did Eichengreen and Sachs). Using an annual data set
covering twenty-four countries, we try to measure (for example) the differ-
ences between countries on and off the gold standard, or between countries
experiencing banking panics and those that did not. A weakness of our ap-
proach is that, lacking objective indicators of the seriousness of financial
problems, we are forced to rely on dummy variables to indicate periods of
crisis. Despite this problem, we generally do find an important role for finan-
cial crises—particularly banking panics—in explaining the link between fall-
ing prices and falling output. Countries in which, for institutional or historical
reasons, deflation led to panics or other severe banking problems had signifi-
cantly worse depressions than countries in which banking was more stable. In
addition, there may have been a feedback loop through which banking panics,
particularly those in the United States, intensified the severity of the world-
wide deflation. Because of data problems, we do not provide direct evidence
of the debt-deflation mechanism; however, we do find that much of the appar-
ent impact of deflation on output is unaccounted for by the mechanisms we35 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
explicitly consider, leaving open the possibility that debt deflation was impor-
tant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly recapitu-
lates the basic case against the interwar gold standard, showing it to have been
a source of deflation and depression, and provides some new evidence con-
sistent with this view. Section 2.3 takes a preliminary look at some mecha-
nisms by which deflation may have been transmitted to depression. In section
2.4, we provide an overview of the financial crises that occurred during the
interwar period. Section 2.5 presents and discusses our main empirical results
on the effects of financial crisis in the 1930s, and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Gold Standard and Deflation
In this section we discuss, and provide some new evidence for, the claim
that a mismanaged interwar gold standard was responsible for the worldwide
deflation of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The gold standard—generally viewed at the time as an essential source of
the relative prosperity of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
was suspended at the outbreak of World War I. Wartime suspension of the gold
standard was not in itself unusual; indeed, Bordo and Kydland (1990) have
argued that wartime suspension, followed by a return to gold at prewar pari-
ties as soon as possible, should be considered part of the gold standard's nor-
mal operation. Bordo and Kydland pointed out that a reputation for returning
to gold at the prewar parity, and thus at something close to the prewar price
level, would have made it easier for a government to sell nominal bonds and
would have increased attainable seignorage. A credible commitment to the
gold standard thus would have had the effect of allowing war spending to be
financed at a lower total cost.
Possibly for these reputational reasons, and certainly because of wide-
spread unhappiness with the chaotic monetary and financial conditions that
followed the war (there were hyperinflations in central Europe and more mod-
erate but still serious inflations elsewhere), the desire to return to gold in the
early 1920s was strong. Of much concern however was the perception that
there was not enough gold available to satisfy world money demands without
deflation. The 1922 Economic and Monetary Conference at Genoa addressed
this issue by recommending the adoption of a gold exchange standard, in
which convertible foreign exchange reserves (principally dollars and pounds)
as well as gold would be used to back national money supplies, thus "econo-
mizing" on gold. Although "key currencies" had been used as reserves before
the war, the Genoa recommendations led to a more widespread and officially
sanctioned use of this practice (Lindert 1969; Eichengreen 1987).
During the 1920s the vast majority of the major countries succeeded in re-
turning to gold. (The first column of table 2.1 gives the dates of return for the36 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
countries in our data set.) Britain returned at the prewar parity in 1925, despite
Keynes's argument that at the old parity the pound would be overvalued. By
the end of 1925, out of a list of 48 currencies given by the League of Nations
(1926), 28 had been pegged to gold. France returned to gold gradually, fol-
lowing the Poincare stabilization, although at a new parity widely believed to
undervalue the franc. By the end of 1928, except for China and a few small
countries on the silver standard, only Spain, Portugal, Rumania, and Japan
had not been brought back into the gold standard system. Rumania went back
on gold in 1929, Portugal did so in practice also in 1929 (although not offi-
cially until 1931), and Japan in December 1930. In the same month the Bank
for International Settlements gave Spain a stabilization loan, but the operation
was frustrated by a revolution in April 1931, carried out by republicans who,
as one of the most attractive features of their program, opposed the foreign
stabilization credits. Spain thus did not join the otherwise nearly universal
membership of the gold standard club.
The classical gold standard of the prewar period functioned reasonably
smoothly and without a major convertibility crisis for more than thirty years.
In contrast, the interwar gold standard, established between 1925 and 1928,
had substantially broken down by 1931 and disappeared by 1936. An exten-
sive literature has analyzed the differences between the classical and interwar
gold standards. This literature has focused, with varying degrees of emphasis,
both on fundamental economic problems that complicated trade and monetary
adjustment in the interwar period and on technical problems of the interwar
gold standard itself.
In terms of "fundamentals," Temin (1989) has emphasized the effects of the
Great War, arguing that, ultimately, the war itself was the shock that initiated
the Depression. The legacy of the war included—besides physical destruc-
tion, which was relatively quickly repaired—new political borders drawn ap-
parently without economic rationale; substantial overcapacity in some sectors
(such as agriculture and heavy industry) and undercapacity in others, relative
to long-run equilibrium; and reparations claims and international war debts
that generated fiscal burdens and fiscal uncertainty. Some writers (notably
Charles Kindleberger) have also pointed to the fact that the prewar gold stan-
dards was a hegemonic system, with Great Britain the unquestioned center. In
contrast, in the interwar period the relative decline of Britain, the inexperience
and insularity of the new potential hegemon (the United States), and ineffec-
tive cooperation among central banks left no one able to take responsibility
for the system as a whole.
The technical problems of the interwar gold standard included the following
three:
1. The asymmetry between surplus and deficit countries in the required
monetary response to gold flows. Temin suggests, correctly we believe, that
this was the most important structural flaw of the gold standard. In theory,








































































































































Source: League of Nations, Yearbook, various dates; and miscellaneous supplementary sources.
inflows were supposed to assist the price-specie flow mechanism by expand-
ing domestic money supplies and inflating, while deficit countries were sup-
posed to reduce money supplies and deflate. In practice, the need to avoid a
complete loss of reserves and an end to convertibility forced deficit countries
to comply with this rule; but, in contrast, no sanction prevented surplus coun-
tries from sterilizing gold inflows and accumulating reserves indefinitely, if
domestic objectives made that desirable. Thus there was a potential deflation-
ary bias in the gold standard's operation.
This asymmetry between surplus and deficit countries also existed in the
prewar period, but with the important difference that the prewar gold standard
centered around the operations of the Bank of England. The Bank of England38 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
of course had to hold enough gold to ensure convertibility, but as a profit-
making institution it also had a strong incentive not to hold large stocks of
barren gold (as opposed to interest-paying assets). Thus the Bank managed
the gold standard (with the assistance of other central banks) so as to avoid
both sustained inflows and sustained outflows of gold; and, indeed, it helped
ensure continuous convertibility with a surprisingly low level of gold re-
serves. In contrast, the two major gold surplus countries of the interwar pe-
riod, the United States and France, had central banks with little or no incentive
to avoid accumulation of gold.
The deflationary bias of the asymmetry in required adjustments was mag-
nified by statutory fractional reserve requirements imposed on many central
banks, especially the new central banks, after the war. While Britain, Norway,
Finland, and Sweden had a fiduciary issue—a fixed note supply backed only
by domestic government securities, above which 100% gold backing was re-
quired—most countries required instead that minimum gold holdings equal a
fixed fraction (usually close to the Federal Reserve's 40%) of central bank
liabilities. These rules had two potentially harmful effects.
First, just as required "reserves" for modern commercial banks are not
really available for use as true reserves, a large portion of central bank gold
holdings were immobilized by the reserve requirements and could not be used
to settle temporary payments imbalances. For example, in 1929, according to
the League of Nations, for 41 countries with a total gold reserve of $9,378
million, only $2,178 million were "surplus" reserves, with the rest required
as cover (League of Nations 1944, 12). In fact, this overstates the quantity of
truly free reserves, because markets and central banks became very worried
when reserves fell within 10% of the minimum. The upshot of this is that
deficit countries could lose very little gold before being forced to reduce their
domestic money supplies; while, as we have noted, the absence of any maxi-
mum reserve limit allowed surplus countries to accept gold inflows without
inflating.
The second and related effect of the fractional reserve requirement has to do
with the relationship between gold outflows and domestic monetary contrac-
tion. With fractional reserves, the relationship between gold outflow and the
reduction in the money supply was not one for one; with a 40% reserve re-
quirement, for example, the impact on the money supply of a gold outflow
was 2.5 times the external loss. So again, loss of gold could lead to an imme-
diate and sharp deflationary impact, not balanced by inflation elsewhere.
2. The pyramiding of reserves. As we have noted, under the interwar gold-
exchange standard, countries other than those with reserve currencies were
encouraged to hold convertible foreign exchange reserves as a partial (or in
some cases, as a nearly complete) substitute for gold. But these convertible
reserves were in turn usually only fractionally backed by gold. Thus, just as a
shift by the public from fractionally backed deposits to currency would lower
the total domestic money supply, the gold-exchange system opened up the39 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
possibility that a shift of central banks from foreign exchange reserves to gold
might lower the world money supply, adding another deflationary bias to the
system. Central banks did abandon foreign exchange reserves en masse in the
early 1930s, when the threat of devaluation made foreign exchange assets
quite risky. According to Eichengreen (1987), however, the statistical evi-
dence is not very clear on whether central banks after selling their foreign
exchange simply lowered their cover ratios, which would have had no direct
effect on money supplies, or shifted into gold, which would have been con-
tractionary. Even if the central banks responded only by lowering cover ratios,
however, this would have increased the sensitivity of their money supplies to
any subsequent outflow of reserves.
3. Insufficient powers of central banks. An important institutional feature of
the interwar gold standard is that, for a majority of the important continental
European central banks, open market operations were not permitted or were
severely restricted. This limitation on central bank powers was usually the
result of the stabilization programs of the early and mid 1920s. By prohibiting
central banks from holding or dealing in significant quantities of government
securities, and thus making monetization of deficits more difficult, the archi-
tects of the stabilizations hoped to prevent future inflation. This forced the
central banks to rely on discount policy (the terms at which they would make
loans to commercial banks) as the principal means of affecting the domestic
money supply. However, in a number of countries the major commercial
banks borrowed very infrequently from the central banks, implying that ex-
cept in crisis periods the central bank's control over the money supply might
be quite weak.
The loosening of the link between the domestic money supply and central
bank reserves may have been beneficial in some cases during the 1930s, if it
moderated the monetary effect of reserve outflows. However, in at least one
very important case the inability of a central bank to conduct open market
operations may have been quite destabilizing. As discussed by Eichengreen
(1986), the Bank of France, which was the recipient of massive gold inflows
until 1932, was one of the banks that was prohibited from conducting open
market operations. This severely limited the ability of the Bank to translate its
gold inflows into monetary expansion, as should have been done in obedience
to the rules of the game. The failure of France to inflate meant that it contin-
ued to attract reserves, thus imposing deflation on the rest of the world.
3
Given both the fundamental economic problems of the international econ-
omy and the structural flaws of the gold standard system, even a relatively
minor deflationary impulse might have had significant repercussions. As it
happened, both of the two major gold surplus countries—France and the
United States, who at the time together held close to 60% of the world's mon-
etary gold—took deflationary paths in 1928-29 (Hamilton 1987).
In the French case, as we have already noted, the deflationary shock took
the form of a largely sterilized gold inflow. For several reasons—including a40 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
successful stabilization with attendant high real interest rates, a possibly
undervalued franc, the lifting of exchange controls, and the perception that
France was a "safe haven" for capital—beginning in early 1928 gold flooded
into that country, an inflow that was to last until 1932. In 1928, France con-
trolled about 15% of the total monetary gold held by the twenty-four countries
in our data set (Board of Governors 1943); this share, already disproportionate
to France's economic importance, increased to 18% in 1929, 22% in 1930,
28% in 1931, and 32% in 1932. Since the U.S. share of monetary gold re-
mained stable at something greater than 40% of the total, the inflow to France
implied significant losses of gold by countries such as Germany, Japan, and
the United Kingdom.
With its accumulation of gold. France should have been expected to inflate;
but in part because of the restrictions on open market operations discussed
above and in part because of deliberate policy choices, the impact of the gold
inflow on French prices was minimal. The French monetary base did increase
with the inflow of reserves, but because economic growth led the demand for
francs to expand even more quickly, the country actually experienced a whole-
sale price deflation of almost 11% between January 1929 and January 1930.
Hamilton (1987) also documents the monetary tightening in the United
States in 1928, a contraction motivated in part by the desire to avoid losing
gold to the French but perhaps even more by the Federal Reserve's determi-
nation to slow down stock market speculation. The U.S. price level fell about
4% over the course of 1929. A business cycle peak was reached in the United
States in August 1929, and the stock market crashed in October.
The initial contractions in the United States and France were largely self-
inflicted wounds; no binding external constraint forced the United States to
deflate in 1929, and it would certainly have been possible for the French gov-
ernment to grant the Bank of France the power to conduct expansionary open
market operations. However, Temin (1989) argues that, once these destabiliz-
ing policy measures had been taken, little could be done to avert deflation and
depression, given the commitment of central banks to maintenance of the gold
standard. Once the deflationary process had begun, central banks engaged in
competitive deflation and a scramble for gold, hoping by raising cover ratios
to protect their currencies against speculative attack. Attempts by any individ-
ual central bank to reflate were met by immediate gold outflows, which forced
the central bank to raise its discount rate and deflate once again. According to
Temin, even the United States, with its large gold reserves, faced this con-
straint. Thus Temin disagrees with the suggestion of Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) that the Federal Reserve's failure to protect the U.S. money supply was
due to misunderstanding of the problem or a lack of leadership; instead, he
claims, given the commitment to the gold standard (and, presumably, the ab-
sence of effective central bank cooperation), the Fed had little choice but to
let the banks fail and the money supply fall.
For our purposes here it does not matter much to what extent central bank41 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
choices could have been other than what they were. For the positive question
of what caused the Depression, we need only note that a monetary contraction
began in the United States and France, and was propagated throughout the
world by the international monetary standard.
4
If monetary contraction propagated by the gold standard was the source of
the worldwide deflation and depression, then countries abandoning the gold
standard (or never adopting it) should have avoided much of the deflationary
pressure. This seems to have been the case. In an important paper, Choudhri
and Kochin (1980) documented that Spain, which never restored the gold
standard and allowed its exchange rate to float, avoided the declines in prices
and output that affected other European countries. Choudhri and Kochin also
showed that the Scandinavian countries, which left gold along with the United
Kingdom in 1931, recovered from the Depression much more quickly than
other small European countries that remained longer on the gold standard.
Much of this had been anticipated in an insightful essay by Haberler (1976).
Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) similarly focused on the beneficial effects of
currency depreciation (i.e., abandonment of the gold standard or devalua-
tion). For a sample of ten European countries, they showed that depreciating
countries enjoyed faster growth of exports and industrial production than
countries which did not depreciate. Depreciating countries also experienced
lower real wages and greater profitability, which presumably helped to in-
crease production. Eichengreen and Sachs argued that depreciation, in this
context, should not necessarily be thought of as a "beggar thy neighbor" pol-
icy; because depreciations reduced constraints on the growth of world money
supplies, they may have conferred benefits abroad as well as at home (al-
though a coordinated depreciation presumably would have been better than
the uncoordinated sequence of depreciations that in fact took place).
5
Some additional evidence of the effects of maintaining or leaving the gold
standard, much in the spirit of Eichengreen and Sachs but using data from a
larger set of countries, is given in our tables 2.2 through 2.4. These tables
summarize the relationships between the decision to adhere to the gold stan-
dard and some key macroeconomic variables, including wholesale price infla-
tion (table 2.2), some indicators of national monetary policies (table 2.3), and
industrial production growth (table 2.4). To construct these tables, we divided
our sample of twenty-four countries into four categories:
6 1) countries not on
the gold standard at all (Spain) or leaving prior to 1931 (Australia and New
Zealand); 2) countries abandoning the full gold standard in 1931 (14 coun-
tries); 3) countries abandoning the gold standard between 1932 and 1935 (Ru-
mania in 1932, the United States in 1933, Italy in 1934, and Belgium in
1935); and 4) countries still on the full gold standard as of 1936 (France,
Netherlands, Poland).
7 Tables 2.2 and 2.4 give the data for each country, as
well as averages for the large cohort of countries abandoning gold in 1931,
for the remnant of the gold bloc still on gold in 1936, and (for 1932-35, when
there were a significant number of countries in each category) for all gold42 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
standard and non-gold standard countries. Since table 2.3 reports data on four
different variables, in order to save space only the averages are shown.
8
The link between deflation and adherence to the gold standard, shown in
table 2.2, seems quite clear. As noted by Choudhri and Kochin (1980),
Spain's abstention from the gold standard insulated that country from the gen-
eral deflation; New Zealand and Australia, presumably because they retained
links to sterling despite early abandonment of the strict gold standard, did
however experience some deflation. Among countries on the gold standard as
of 1931, there is a rather uniform experience of about a 13% deflation in both
1930 and 1931. But after 1931 there is a sharp divergence between those
countries on and those off the gold standard. Price levels in countries off the
gold standard have stabilized by 1933 (with one or two exceptions), and these
countries experience mild inflations in 1934-36. In contrast, the gold standard
countries continue to deflate, although at a slower rate, until the gold stan-
dard's dissolution in 1936.
With such clearly divergent price behavior between countries on and off
gold, one would expect to see similarly divergent behavior in monetary pol-
icy. Table 2.3 compares the average behavior of the growth rates of three mon-
etary aggregates, called for short MO, Ml, and M2, and of changes in the
central bank discount rate. MO corresponds to money and notes in circulation,
Ml is the sum of MO and commercial bank deposits, and M2 is the sum of
Ml and savings bank deposits.
9 The expected differences in the monetary po-
lices of the gold and non-gold countries seem to be in the data, although some-
what less clearly than we had anticipated. In particular, despite the twelve
percentage point difference in rates of deflation between gold and non-gold
countries in 1932, the differences in average money growth in that year be-
tween the two classes of countries are minor; possibly, higher inflation expec-
tations in the countries abandoning gold reduced money demand and thus
became self-confirming. From 1933 through 1935, however, the various mon-
etary indicators are more consistent with the conclusion stressed by Eichen-
green and Sachs (1985), that leaving the gold standard afforded countries
more latitude to expand their money supplies and thus to escape deflation.
The basic proposition of the gold standard-based explanation of the
Depression is that, because of its deflationary impact, adherence to the gold
standard had very adverse consequences for real activity. The validity of this
proposition is shown rather clearly by table 2.4, which gives growth rates of
industrial production for the countries in our sample. While the countries
which were to abandon the gold standard in 1931 did slightly worse in 1930
and 1931 than the nations of the Gold Bloc, subsequent to leaving gold these
countries performed much better. Between 1932 and 1935, growth of indus-
trial production in countries not on gold averaged about seven percentage
points a year better than countries remaining on gold, a very substantial effect.
In summary, data from our sample of twenty-four countries support theTable 2.2 Log-differences of the Wholesale Price Index
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936










































































































































Average -.13 -.12 -.01 .00 .02 .03 .04






































































Note: Data on wholesale prices are from League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and Yearbook,
various issues. Dates in parentheses are years in which countries abandoned gold, with "abandon-
ment" defined to include the imposition of foreign exchange controls or devaluation as well as suspen-
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Note: M0 is money and notes in cirulation. Ml is base money plus commercial bank deposits.
M2 is Ml plus savings deposits. Growth rates of monetary aggregates are calculated as log-
differences. The discount rate change is in percentage points. The data are from League of Na-
tions, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and Yearbook, various issues.
view that there was a strong link between adherence to the gold standard and
the severity of both deflation and depression. The data are also consistent with
the hypothesis that increased freedom to engage in monetary expansion was a
reason for the better performance of countries leaving the gold standard early
in the 1930s, although the evidence in this case is a bit less clear-cut.
2.3 The Link Between Deflation and Depression
Given the above discussion and evidence, it seems reasonable to accept the
idea that the worldwide deflation of the early 1930s was the result of a mone-
tary contraction transmitted through the international gold standard. But this45 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
Table 2.4 Log-differences of the Industrial Production Index
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936










































































































































Average -.05 -.12 -.07 .08 .13 .10 .08


























































Average -.04 -.11 -.17 .10 .02 .00 .06
5. Grand averages
Gold standard countries -.18 .09 .03 .01
Non-gold countries -.06 .08 .12 .09
Note: Data on industrial production are from League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
and Yearbook, various issues, supplemented by League of Nations, Industrialization and Foreign
Trade, 1945.46 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
raises the more difficult question of what precisely were the channels linking
deflation (falling prices) and depression (falling output). This section takes a
preliminary look at some suggested mechanisms. We first introduce here two
principal channels emphasized in recent research, then discuss the alternative
of induced financial crisis.
1. Real wages. If wages possess some degree of nominal rigidity, then fall-
ing output prices will raise real wages and lower labor demand. Downward
stickiness of wages (or of other input costs) will also lower profitability, poten-
tially reducing investment. This channel is stressed by Eichengreen and Sachs
(see in particular their 1986 paper) and has also been emphasized by Newell
and Symons (1988).
Some evidence on the behavior of real wages during the Depression is pre-
sented in table 2.5, which is similar in format to tables 2.2-2.4. Note that
table 2.5 uses the wholesale price index (the most widely available price in-
dex) as the wage deflator. According to this table, there were indeed large real
wage increases in most countries in 1930 and 1931. After 1931, countries
leaving the gold standard experienced a mild decline in real wages, while real
wages in gold standard countries exhibited a mild increase. These findings are
similar to those of Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).
The reliance on nominal wage stickiness to explain the real effects of the
deflation is consistent with the Keynesian tradition, but is nevertheless some-
what troubling in this context. Given (i) the severity of the unemployment that
was experienced during that time; (ii) the relative absence of long-term con-
tracts and the weakness of unions; and (iii) the presumption that the general
public was aware that prices, and hence the cost of living, were falling, it is
hard to understand how nominal wages could have been so unresponsive.
Wages had fallen quickly in many countries in the contraction of 1921-22. In
the United States, nominal wages were maintained until the fall of 1931 (pos-
sibly by an agreement among large corporations; see O'Brien 1989), but fell
sharply after that; in Germany, the government actually tried to depress wages
early in the Depression. Why then do we see these large real wage increases
in the data?
One possibility is measurement problems. There are a number of issues,
such as changes in skill and industrial composition, that make measuring the
cyclical movement in real wages difficult even today. Bernanke (1986) has
argued, in the U.S. context, that because of sharp reductions in workweeks
and the presence of hoarded labor, the measure real wage may have been a
poor measure of the marginal cost of labor.
Also in the category of measurement issues, Eichengreen and Hatton
(1987) correctly point out that nominal wages should be deflated by the rele-
vant product prices, not a general price index. Their table of product wage
indices (nominal wages relative to manufacturing prices) is reproduced for
1929-38 and for the five countries for which data are available as our table
2.6. Like table 2.5, this table also shows real wages increasing in the early47 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
Table 2.5 Log-differences of the Real Wage
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
























































































































Average .14 .11 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.02


























































Average .15 .10 .09 .02 .01 .03 -.05
5. Grand averages
Gold standard countries .05 .03 .01 .02
Non-gold countries -.02 -.03 -.03 -.04
Note: The real wage is the nominal hourly wage for males (skilled, if available) divided by the
wholesale price index. Wage data are from the International Labour Office, Year Book of Labor





































































Source: Eichengreen and Hatton (1987, 15).
1930s, but overall the correlation of real wage increases and depression does
not appear particularly good. Note that Germany, which had probably the
worst unemployment problem of any major country, has almost no increase in
real wages;
1
0 the United Kingdom, which began to recover in 1932, has real
wages increasing on a fairly steady trend during its recovery period; and the
United States has only a small dip in real wages at the beginning of its recov-
ery, followed by more real wage growth. The case for nominal wage stickiness
as a transmission mechanism thus seems, at this point, somewhat mixed.
2. Real interest rates. In a standard IS-LM macro model, a monetary con-
traction depresses output by shifting the LM curve leftwards, raising real in-
terest rates, and thus reducing spending. However, as Temin (1976) pointed
out in his original critique of Friedman and Schwartz, it is real rather than
nominal money balances that affect the LM curve; and since prices were fall-
ing sharply, real money balances fell little or even rose during the contraction.
Even if real money balances are essentially unchanged, however, there is
another means by which deflation can raise ex ante real interest rates: Since
cash pays zero nominal interest, in equilibrium no asset can bear a nominal
interest rate that is lower than its liquidity and risk premia relative to cash.
Thus an expected deflation of 10% will impose a real rate of at least 10% on
the economy, even with perfectly flexible prices and wages. In an IS-LM dia-
gram drawn with the nominal interest rate on the vertical axis, an increase in
expected deflation amounts to a leftward shift of the IS curve.
Whether the deflation of the early 1930s was anticipated has been exten-
sively debated (although almost entirely in the United States context). We will
add here two points in favor of the view that the extent of the worldwide
deflation was less than fully anticipated.
First, there is the question of whether the nominal interest rate floor was in
fact binding in the deflating countries (as it should have been if this mecha-
nism was to operate). Although interest rates on government debt in the
United States often approximated zero in the 1930s, it is less clear that this49 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
was true for other countries. The yield on French treasury bills, for example,
rose from a low of 0.75% in 1932 to 2.06% in 1933, 2.25% in 1934, and
3.38% in 1935; during 1933-35 the nominal yield on French treasury bills
exceeded that of British treasury bills by several hundred basis points on av-
erage."
Second, the view that deflation was largely anticipated must contend with
the fact that nominal returns on safe assets were very similar whether coun-
tries abandoned or stayed on gold. If continuing deflation was anticipated in
the gold standard countries, while inflation was expected in countries leaving
gold, the similarity of nominal returns would have implied large expected
differences in real returns. Such differences are possible in equilibrium, if they
are counterbalanced by expected real exchange rate changes; nevertheless,
differences in expected real returns between countries on and off gold on the




3. Financial crisis. A third mechanism by which deflation can induce
depression, not considered in the recent literature, works through deflation's
effect on the operation of the financial system. The source of the non-
neutrality is simply that debt instruments (including deposits) are typically set
in money terms. Deflation thus weakens the financial positions of borrowers,
both nonfinancial firms and financial intermediaries.
Consider first the case of intermediaries (banks).
1
3 Bank liabilities (primar-
ily deposits) are fixed almost entirely in nominal terms. On the asset side,
depending on the type of banking system (see below), banks hold either pri-
marily debt instruments or combinations of debt and equity. Ownership of
debt and equity is essentially equivalent to direct ownership of capital; in this
case, therefore, the bank's liabilities are nominal and its assets are real, so that
an unanticipated deflation begins to squeeze the bank's capital position im-
mediately. When only debt is held as an asset, the effect of deflation is for a
while neutral or mildly beneficial to the bank. However, when borrowers'
equity cushions are exhausted, the bank becomes the owner of its borrowers'
real assets, so eventually this type of bank will also be squeezed by deflation.
As pressure on the bank's capital grows, according to this argument, its
normal functioning will be impeded; for example, it may have to call in loans
or refuse new ones. Eventually, impending exhaustion of bank capital leads to
a depositors' run, which eliminates the bank or drastically curtails its opera-
tion. The final result is usually a government takeover of the intermediation
process. For example, a common scenario during the Depression was for the
government to finance an acquisition of a failing bank by issuing its own debt;
this debt was held (directly or indirectly) by consumers, in lieu of (vanishing)
commercial bank deposits. Thus, effectively, government agencies became
part of the intermediation chain.
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Although the problems of the banks were perhaps the more dramatic in the
Depression, the same type of non-neutrality potentially affects nonfinancial50 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
firms and other borrowers. The process of "debt deflation", that is, the in-
crease in the real value of nominal debt obligations brought about by falling
prices, erodes the net worth position of borrowers. A weakening financial
position affects the borrower's actions (e.g., the firm may try to conserve fi-
nancial capital by laying off workers or cutting back on investment) and also,
by worsening the agency problems in the borrower-lender relationship, im-
pairs access to new credit. Thus, as discussed in detail in Bernanke and Ger-
tler (1990), "financial distress" (such as that induced by debt deflation) can in
principle impose deadweight losses on an economy, even if firms do not
undergo liquidation.
Before trying to assess the quantitative impact of these and other channels
on output, we briefly discuss the international incidence of financial crisis
during the Depression.
2.4 Interwar Banking and Financial Crises
Financial crises were of course a prominent feature of the interwar period.
We focus in this section on the problems of the banking sector and, to a lesser
extent, on the problems of domestic debtors in general, as suggested by the
discussion above. Stock market crashes and defaults on external debt were
also important, of course, but for the sake of space will take a subsidiary role
here.
Table 2.7 gives a chronology of some important interwar banking crises.
The episodes listed actually cover a considerable range in terms of severity, as
the capsule descriptions should make clear. However the chronology should
also show that (i) quite a few different countries experienced significant bank-
ing problems during the interwar period; and (ii) these problems reached a
very sharp peak between the spring and fall of 1931, following the Creditan-
stalt crisis in May 1931 as well as the intensification of banking problems in
Germany.
A statistical indicator of banking problems, emphasized by Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), is the deposit-currency ratio. Data on the changes in the
commercial bank deposit-currency ratio for our panel of countries are pre-
sented in table 2.8. It is interesting to compare this table with the chronology
in table 2.7. Most but not all of the major banking crises were associated with
sharp drops in the deposit-currency ratio; the most important exception is in
1931 in Italy, where the government was able to keep secret much of the bank-
ing system's problems until a government takeover was affected. On the other
hand, there were also significant drops in the deposit-currency ratio that were
not associated with panics; restructurings of the banking system and exchange
rate difficulties account for some of these episodes.
What caused the banking panics? At one level, the panics were an endoge-
nous response to deflation and the operation of the gold standard regime.51 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression



























Beginning of deposit contraction of 1921-22, leading
to bank restructurings. Government assistance
administered through Credit Bank of 1922.
Bank failures (notably Marx & Co.) and
amalgamations.
Heavy losses of one of the largest banks, Danske
Landmandsbank, and liquidation of smaller banks.
Landmandsbank continues to operate until a restructing
in April 1928 under a government guarantee.
Failure of Centralbanken for Norge.
Difficulties of a major bank, Allgemeine
Depositenbank; liquidation in July.
In wake of the Tokyo earthquake, bad debts threaten
Bank of Taiwan and Bank of Chosen, which are
restructured with government help.
Failure of Banco de la Union Mineira and Banco
Vasca.
Bank runs cause three large banks to stop payments.
The shakeout of banks continues through 1927.
Numerous smaller banks in difficulties, but no major
failures.
Thirty-two banks unable to make payments.
Restructuring of 15th Bank and Bank of Taiwan.
Collapse of Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs AG,
followed by failures of smaller banks, and runs on
Berlin and Frankfurt savings banks.
Bodencreditanstalt, second largest bank, fails and is
merged with Creditanstalt.
Failure of Banque Adam, Boulogne-sur-Mer, and
Oustric Group. Runs on provincial banks.
Failure of two medium-sized banks, Estonia
Government Bank Tallin and Reval Credit Bank; crisis
lasts until January.
Failure of Bank of the United States.
Withdrawals from three largest banks begin. A panic
ensues in April 1931, followed by a government
reorganization and takeover of frozen industrial assets.
Government deals with banking panic by allowing
Banco de Nacion to rediscount commercial paper from
other banks at government-owned Caja de Conversion.52 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
Table 2.7 (continued)
Date Country Crises
May 1931 AUSTRIA Failure of Creditanstalt and run of foreign depositors.
BELGIUM Rumors about imminent failure of Banque de
Bruxelles, the country's second largest bank, induce
withdrawals from all banks. Later in the year,
expectations of devaluation lead to withdrawals of
foreign deposits.
June 1931 POLAND Run on banks, especially on Warsaw Discount Bank,













Bank runs, extending difficulties plaguing the banking
system since the summer of 1930. After large loss of
deposits in June and increasing strain on foreign
exchanges, many banks are unable to make payments
and Darmstadter Bank closes. Bank holiday.
Run on Budapest banks (especially General Credit
Bank). Foreign withdrawals followed by a foreign
creditors' standstill agreement. Bank holiday.
Run on banks with German connections. Bank of
Libau and International Bank of Riga particularly hard
hit.
Failure of Vienna Mercur-Bank.
Withdrawal of foreign deposits sparks domestic
withdrawals but no general banking panic.
Run on branches of Deutsche Bank and collapse of
Banque Turque pour le Commerce et l'lndustrie, in
wake of German crisis.
Run on Cairo and Alexandria branches of Deutsche
Orientbank.
Union Financiere de Geneve rescued by takeover by
Comptoir d'Escompte de Geneve.
Collapse of German-controlled Banca Generala a Tarii
Romanesti. Run on Banca de Credit Roman and Banca
Romaneasca.
Suspension of payments after run on Credito Espanol
de Mexico. Run on Banco Nacional de Mexico.
Series of banking panics, with October 1931 the worst




External drain, combined with rumors of threat to
London merchant banks with heavy European
(particularly Hungarian and German) involvements.
General bank run following sterling crisis; second




























Failure of Banca Marmerosch, Blank & Co. Heavy
bank runs.
Collapse of major deposit bank Banque Nationale de
Credit (restructured as Banque Nationale pour le
Commerce et l'lndustrie). Other bank failures and bank
runs.
Weakness of one large bank (Skandinaviska
Kreditaktiebolaget) as result of collapse of Kreuger
industrial and financial empire, but no general panic.
Losses of large investment bank Banque de l'Union
Parisienne forces merger with Credit Mobilier
Francois.
Series of bank failures in Chicago.
New wave of bank failures, especially in the Midwest
and Far West.
General banking panic, leading to state holidays and a
nationwide bank holiday in March.
Restructuring of large bank (Banque Populaire Suisse)
after heavy losses.
Failure of Banque Beige de Travail develops into
general banking and exchange crisis.
Bank problems throughout the fall induce government-
sponsored merger of four weak banks (Banco Espanol
del Rio de la Plata, Banco el Hogar Argentina, Banco
Argentina-Uruguayo, Ernesto Tomquist & Co.).
Deposits fall after Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
After years of deposit stability, legislation introducing
a tax on bank deposits leads to withdrawals (until fall).
Anticipation of second devaluation of the crown leads
to deposit withdrawals.
When the peak of the world banking crisis came in 1931, there had already
been almost two years of deflation and accompanying depression. Consistent
with the analysis at the end of the last section, falling prices lowered the nom-
inal value of bank assets but not the nominal value of bank liabilities. In ad-
dition, the rules of the gold standard severely limited the ability of central
banks to ameliorate panics by acting as a lender of last resort; indeed, since
banking panics often coincided with exchange crises (as we discuss further
below), in order to maintain convertibility central banks typically tightened
monetary policy in the face of panics. Supporting the connection of banking
problems with deflation and "rules of the game" constraints is the observation











































































































































































































Note: Entries are the log-differences of the ratio of commercial bank deposits to money and notes in
circulation. Data are from League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and Yearbook, various is-
sues.
*Decline exceeds .10.
donment of the gold standard—although it is also true that by time the gold
standard was abandoned, strong financial reform measures had been taken in
most countries.
However, while deflation and adherence to the gold standard were neces-
sary conditions for panics, they were not sufficient; a number of countries
made it through the interwar period without significant bank runs or failures,
despite being subject to deflationary shocks similar to those experienced by
the countries with banking problems.
1
5 Several factors help to explain which
countries were the ones to suffer panics.
1. Banking structure. The organization of the banking system was an im-
portant factor in determining vulnerability to panics. First, countries with
"unit banking," that is, with a large number of small and relatively undiversi-
fied banks, suffered more severe banking panics. The leading example is of
course the United States, where concentration in banking was very low, but a
high incidence of failures among small banks was also seen in other countries
(e.g., France). Canada, with branch banking, suffered no bank failures during55 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
the Depression (although many branches were closed). Sweden and the




Second, where "universal" or "mixed" banking on the German or Belgian
model was the norm, it appears that vulnerability to deflation was greater. In
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model of banking, where at least in theory lend-
ing was short term and the relationship between banks and corporations had
an arm's length character, universal banks took long-term and sometimes
dominant ownership positions in client firms. Universal bank assets included
both long-term securities and equity participations; the former tended to be-
come illiquid during a crisis, while the latter exposed universal banks (unlike
Anglo-Saxon banks, which held mainly debt instruments) to the effects of
stock market crashes. The most extreme case was probably Austria. By 1931,
after a series of mergers, the infamous Creditanstalt was better thought of as a
vast holding company rather than a bank; at the time of its failure in May
1931, the Creditanstalt owned sixty-four companies, amounting to 65% of
Austria's nominal capital (Kindleberger 1984).
2. Reliance of banks on short-term foreign liabilities. Some of the most
serious banking problems were experienced in countries in which a substantial
fraction of deposits were foreign-owned. The so-called hot money was more
sensitive to adverse financial developments than were domestic deposits.
Runs by foreign depositors represented not only a loss to the banking system
but also, typically, a loss of reserves; as we have noted, this additional external
threat restricted the ability of the central bank to respond to the banking situ-
ation. Thus, banking crises and exchange rate crises became intertwined.
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The resolution of a number of the central European banking crises required
"standstill agreements," under which withdrawals by foreign creditors were
blocked pending future negotiation.
International linkages were important on the asset side of bank balance
sheets as well. Many continental banks were severely affected by the crises in
Austria and Germany, in particular.
3. Financial and economic experience of the 1920s. It should not be partic-
ularly surprising that countries which emerged from the 1920s in relatively
weaker condition were more vulnerable to panics. Austria, Germany, Hun-
gary, and Poland all suffered hyperinflation and economic dislocation in the
1930s, and all suffered severe banking panics in 1931. While space constraints
do not permit a full discussion of the point here, it does seem clear that the
origins of the European financial crisis were at least partly independent of
American developments—which argues against a purely American-centered
explanation of the origins of the Depression.
It should also be emphasized, though, that not just the existence of financial
difficulties during the 1920s but also the policy response to those difficulties
was important. Austria is probably the most extreme case of nagging banking
problems being repeatedly "papered over." That country had banking prob-56 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
lems throughout the 1920s, which were handled principally by merging fail-
ing banks into still-solvent banks. An enforced merger of the Austrian Bod-
encreditanstalt with two failing banks in 1927 weakened that institution,
which was part of the reason that the Bodencreditanstalt in turn had to be
forceably merged with the Creditanstalt in 1929. The insolvency of the Cre-
ditanstalt, finally revealed when a director refused to sign an "optimistic" fi-
nancial statement in May 1931, sparked the most intense phase of the Euro-
pean crisis.
In contrast, when banking troubles during the earlier part of the 1920s were
met with fundamental reform, performance of the banking sector during the
Depression was better. Examples were Sweden, Japan, and the Netherlands,
all of which had significant banking problems during the 1920s but responded
by fundamental restructurings and assistance to place banks on a sound foot-
ing (and to close the weakest banks). Possibly because of these earlier events,
these three countries had limited problems in the 1930s. A large Swedish bank
(Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget) suffered heavy losses after the collapse of
the Kreuger financial empire, and a medium-sized Dutch bank (Amstelbank)
failed because of its connection to the Creditanstalt; but there were no wide-
spread panics, only isolated failures.
A particularly interesting comparison in this regard is between the Nether-
lands and neighboring Belgium, where banking problems persisted from 1931
to 1935 and where the ultimate devaluation of the Belgian franc was the result
of an attempt to protect banks from further drains. Both countries were heav-
ily dependent on foreign trade and both remained on gold, yet the Nether-
lands did much better than Belgium in the early part of the Depression (see
table 2.4). This is a bit of evidence for the relevance of banking difficulties to
output.
Overall, while banking crises were surely an endogenous response to
depression, the incidence of crisis across countries reflected a variety of insti-
tutional factors and other preconditions. Thus it will be of interest to compare
the real effects of deflation between countries with and without severe banking
difficulties.
On "debt deflation," that is, the problems of nonfmancial borrowers, much
less has been written than on the banking crises. Only for the United States
has the debt problem in the 1930s been fairly well documented (see the sum-
mary in Bernanke 1983 and the references therein). In that country, large cor-
porations avoided serious difficulties, but most other sectors—small busi-
nesses, farmers, mortgage borrowers, state and local governments—were
severely affected, with usually something close to half of outstanding debts
being in default. A substantial portion of New Deal reforms consisted of var-
ious forms of debt adjustment and relief.
For other countries, there are plenty of anecdotes but not much systematic
data. Aggregate data on bankruptcies and defaults are difficult to interpret
because increasing financial distress forced changes in bankruptcy practices57 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
and procedures; when the League of Nations' Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
dropped its table on bankruptcies in its December 1932 issue, for example,
the reason given therein was that "the numerous forms of agreement by which
open bankruptcies are now avoided have seriously diminished the value of the
table" (p. 529). Perhaps the most extreme case of a change in rules was Ru-
mania's April 1932 Law on Conversion of Debts, which essentially eliminated
the right of creditors to force bankruptcy. Changes in the treatment of bank-
ruptcy no doubt ameliorated the effects of debt default, but the fact that these
changes occurred indicates that the perceived problem must have been severe.
More detailed country-by-country study of the effects of deflation on firm bal-
ance sheets and the relation of financial condition to firm investment, produc-
tion, and employment decisions—where the data permit—would be ex-
tremely valuable. A similar comment applies to external debt problems,
although here interesting recent work by Eichengreen and Portes (1986) and
others gives us a much better base of knowledge to build on than is available
for the case of domestic debts.
2.5 Regression Results
In this section we present empirical results based on our panel data set. The
principal question of interest is the relative importance of various transmission
mechanisms of deflation to output. We also address the question, so far not
discussed, of whether banking crises could have intensified the deflation pro-
cess itself.
The basic set of results is contained in table 2.9, which relates the log-
differences in industrial production for our set of countries to various combi-
nations of explanatory variables. The definitions of the right-hand-side vari-
ables are as follows:
AlnPW: log-difference of the wholesale price index;
AlnEX: log-difference of nominal exports;
AlnW: log-difference of nominal wage;
DISC: central bank discount rate, measured relative to its 1929 value (a
government bond rate is used for Canada; since no 1929 interest rate
could be found for New Zealand, that country is excluded in regres-
sions including DISC);
PANIC: a dummy variable, set equal to the number of months during the
year that the country experienced serious banking problems (see be-
low);
AlnMO: log-difference of money and notes in circulation.
Exports are included to control for trade effects on growth, including the
benefits of competitive devaluation discussed by Eichengreen and Sachs
(1986); and the wage is included to test for the real wage channel of transmis-
sion from deflation to depression. Of course, theory says that both of these58 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
variables should enter in real rather than in nominal terms; unfortunately, in
practice the theoretically suggested deflator is not always available (as we
noted in our discussion of the real wage above). We resolve this problem by
supposing that the true equation is, for example,
(1) Aln/P = pe (AlnEX - AlnP,) + $w (AlnW - AlnPJ + error
where Pe and Pw, the optimal deflators, are not available. Let the projections
of log-changes in the unobserved deflators on the log-change in the wholesale
price deflator be given by
(2) AlnP, = \\ftMnPW + ui i = e,w
where the uj are uncorrelated with Aln/W and presumably the i|i. are positive.
Then (1) becomes
(3) Aln/P = -(PA + $wtyJA\nPW + p,Aln£X + (^AlnW + new error
This suggests allowing AlnPW and the nominal growth rates of exports and
wages to enter the equation separately, which is how we proceed.
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AlnPW in the equation separately has the added advantage of allowing us to
account for any additional effect of deflation (such as debt deflation) not ex-
plicitly captured by the other independent variables.
The discount rate DISC is included to allow for the interest rate channel and
as an additional proxy for monetary policy. Since AlnPW is included in every
equation, inclusion of the nominal interest rate DISC is equivalent to includ-
ing the actual ex post real interest rate, that is, we are effectively assuming
that deflation was fully anticipated; this should give the real interest rate hy-
pothesis its best chance.
In an attempt to control for fiscal policy, we also included measures of cen-
tral government expenditure in our first estimated equations. Since the esti-
mated coefficients were always negative (the wrong sign), small, and statisti-
cally insignificant, the government expenditure variable is excluded from the
results reported here.
Construction of the dummy variable PANIC required us to make a judgment
about which countries' banking crises were most serious, which we did from
our reading of primary and secondary sources. We dated periods of crisis as
starting from the first severe banking problems; if there was some clear de-
marcation point (such as the U.S. bank holiday of 1933), we used that as the
ending date of the crisis; otherwise we arbitrarily assumed that the effects of
the crisis would last for one year after its most intense point. The banking
crises included in the dummy are as follows (see also table 2.7):
1. Austria (May 1931-January 1933): from the Creditanstalt crisis to the
date of official settlement of the Creditanstalt's foreign debt.
2. Belgium (May 1931-April 1932; March 1934-February 1935): for one
year after the initial Belgian crisis, following Creditanstalt, and for one59 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
year after the failure of the Banque Beige de Travail led to a general
crisis.
3. Estonia (September 1931-August 1932): for one year after the general
banking crisis.
4. France (November 1930-October 1932): for one year following each of
the two peaks of the French banking crises, in November 1930 and Oc-
tober 1931 (see Bouvier 1984).
5. Germany (May 1931-December 1932): from the beginning of the major
German banking crisis until the creation of state institutes for the liqui-
dation of bad bank debts.
6. Hungary (July 1931-June 1932): for one year following the runs in Bu-
dapest and the bank holiday.
7. Italy (April 1931-December 1932): from the onset of the banking panic
until the takeover of bank assets by a massive new state holding com-
pany, the Istituto por le Riconstruzione Industriale (IRI).
8. Latvia (July 1931-June 1932): for one year following the onset of the
banking crisis.
9. Poland (June 1931-May 1932): for one year following the onset of the
banking crisis.
10. Rumania (July 1931-September 1932): from the onset of the crisis until
one year after its peak in October 1931.
11. United States (December 1930-March 1933): from the failure of the
Bank of the United States until the bank holiday.
The inclusion of Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Rumania, or the United States in the above list cannot be controver-
sial; each of these countries suffered serious panics. (One might quibble on
the margin about the exact dating given—for example, Temin [1989] and oth-
ers have argued that the U.S. banking crisis did not really begin until mid
1931—but we doubt very much that changes of a few months on these dates
would affect the results.) The inclusion of France and Italy is more controver-
sial. For example, Bouvier (1984) argues that the French banking crisis was
not as serious as some others, since although there were runs and many banks
failed, the very biggest banks survived; also, according to Bouvier, French
banks were not as closely tied to industry as other banking systems on the
Continent. For Italy, as we have noted, early and massive government inter-
vention reduced the incidence of panic (see Ciocca and Toniolo 1984); how-
ever, the banks were in very poor condition and (as noted above) eventually
signed over most of their industrial assets to the IRI.
To check the sensitivity of our results, we reestimated the key equations
omitting first the French crisis from the PANIC variable, then the French and
Italian crises. Leaving out France had a minor effect (lowering the coefficient60 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
on PANIC and its f-statistic about 5% in a typical equation); the additional
exclusion of the Italian crisis has essentially no effect.
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As a further check, we also reestimated our key equations omitting, in
separate runs, (i) the United States; (ii) Germany and Austria; and (iii) all
eastern European countries. In none of these equations were our basic results
substantially weakened, which indicates that no single country or small group
of countries is driving our findings.
The first seven equations in table 2.9 are not derived from any single model,
but instead attempt to nest various suggested explanations of the link between
deflation and depression. Estimation was by OLS, which opens up the possi-
bility of simultaneity bias; however, given our maintained view that the defla-
tion was imposed by exogenous monetary forces, a case can be made for treat-
ing the right-hand-side variables as exogenous or predetermined.




1. Export growth consistently enters the equation for output growth
strongly, with a plausible coefficient and a high level of statistical significance.
2. When wage growth is included in the output equation along with only


































































Note: For variable definitions, see text. The sample period is 1930-36. The panel consists of
twenty-four countries except that, due to missing wage data, Finland, Greece, and Spain are
excluded from equations (5)-(8). Estimates of country-specific dummies are not reported. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
*Export growth is measured in real terms in equation (8).61 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
Only when the PANIC variable is included does nominal wage growth have
the correct (negative) sign (rows 6 and 7). In the equation encompassing all
the various channels (row 7), the estimated coefficient on wage growth is of
the right sign and a reasonable magnitude, but it is not statistically significant.
3. The discount rate enters the encompassing equation (row 7) with the
right sign and a high significance level. A 100-basis-point increase in the dis-
count rate is estimated to reduce the growth rate of industrial production by
3.6 percentage points.
4. The effect of banking panics on output is large (a year of panic is esti-
mated in equation (7) to reduce output growth by 12 X .0138, or more than
16 percentage points) and highly statistically significant (f-statistics of 4.0 or
better). The measured effect of the PANIC variable does not seem to depend
much on what other variables are included in the equation.
5. There may be some residual effect of deflation on output not accounted
for by any of these effects. To see this, note that in principle the coefficient on
AlnPW in equation (7) of table 2.9 should be equal to and opposite the
weighted sum of the coefficients on AlnEX, AlnW, and DISC (where the
weights are the projection coefficients of the respective "true" deflators on
AlnPW). Suppose for the sake of illustration that each of the projection coef-
ficients equals one (that is, the wholesale price index is the correct deflator).
Then the expected value of the coefficient on AlnPW should be approximately
.052; the actual value is .296, with a standard error of .123. Thus there may
be channels relating deflation to depression other than the ones explicitly ac-
counted for here. One possibility is that we are simply picking up the effects
of a simultaneity bias (a reverse causation from output to prices). Alterna-
tively, it is possible that an additional factor, such as debt deflation, should be
considered.
As an alternative to the procedure of nesting alternative channels in a single
equation, in equation (8) of table 2.9 we report the results of estimating the
reduced form of a simple aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AD-AS) sys-
tem. Under conventional assumptions, in an AD-AS model output growth
should depend on money growth and autonomous spending growth (repre-
sented here by growth in real exports
21), which shift the AD curve; and on
nominal wage growth, which shifts the AS curve. In addition, we allow
PANIC to enter the system, since banking panics could in principle affect both
aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The results indicate large and statis-
tically significant effects on output growth for real export growth, money
growth, and banking panics. Nominal wage growth enters with the correct
sign, but the coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant.
We have so far focused on the effects of banking panics (and other vari-
ables) on output. There is an additional issue that warrants some discussion
here; namely, the possibility that banking panics might have themselves wors-
ened the deflationary process.
Some care must be taken with this argument. Banking panics undoubtedly62 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
had large effects on the composition of national money supplies, money mul-
tipliers, and money demand. Nevertheless, as has been stressed by Temin
(1989), under a gold standard, small country price levels are determined by
international monetary conditions, to which domestic money supplies and de-
mands must ultimately adjust. Thus banking panics cannot intensify deflation
in a small country.
2
2 Indeed, a regression (not reported) of changes in whole-
sale prices against the PANIC variable and time dummies (in order to isolate
purely cross-sectional effects) confirms that there is very little relationship
between the two variables.
The proposition that bank panics should not affect the price level does not
necessarily hold for a large country, however. In econometric language, under
a gold standard the price level of a large country must be cointegrated with
world prices; but while this means that domestic prices must eventually adjust
to shocks emanating from abroad, it also allows for the possibility that domes-
tic shocks will influence the world price level. Notice that if banking panics
led to deflationary shocks in a large country and these shocks were transmitted
around the world by the gold standard, a cross-sectional comparison would
find no link between panics and the price level.
The discussion of the gold standard and deflation in section 2.2 cited Ham-
ilton's (1987) view that the initial deflationary impulses in 1928-29 came
from France and the United States—both "big" countries, in terms of eco-
nomic importance and because of their large gold reserves. This early defla-
tion obviously cannot be blamed on banking panics, since these did not begin
until at least the end of 1930. But it would not be in any way inconsistent with
the theory of the gold standard to hypothesize that banking panics in France
and the United States contributed to world deflation during 1931-32.
2
3
Empirical evidence bearing on this question is presented in table 2.10. We
estimated equations for wholesale price inflation in the United States and
France, using monthly data for the five-year period 1928-32. We included an
error-correction term in both equations to allow for cointegration between the
U.S. and French price levels, as would be implied by the gold standard. This
error-correction term is the difference between the \og-levels of U.S. and
French wholesale prices in period t — 1; if U.S. and French prices are in fact
cointegrated, then the growth rate of U.S. prices should respond negatively to
the difference between the U.S. price and the French price, and the French
growth rate of prices should respond positively. Also included in the equations
are lagged inflation rates (to capture transitory price dynamics), current and
lagged base money growth, and current and lagged values of the deposits of
failing banks (for the United States only, due to data availability).
The results are interesting. First, there is evidence for cointegration: The
error-correction terms have the right signs and reasonable magnitudes, al-
though only the U.S. term is statistically significant. Thus we may infer that
shocks hitting either French or U.S. prices ultimately affected both price lev-
els. Second, both U.S. base money growth and bank failures are important63 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
Table 2.10 Error-correction Equations for U.S. and French Wholesale Prices
Constant
Log USAWPI - log FRAWPI
(lagged once)
Four lags of own WPI growth
Current and four lags of base
money growth
Current and four lags of












(F = 1.57;/> =
1.412
(F = 5.62; p =
-.020
















= 2.48; p = .057)
.519
= 0.78; p = .569)
.307
1.87
Note: Deposits of failing banks are from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. USAWPI and FRAWPI are
wholesale price indexes for the United States and France, respectively. Monthly data from 1928
to 1932 are used.
determinants of the U.S. (and by extension, the French) deflation rates; these
two variables enter the U.S. price equation with the right sign and marginal
significance levels of .0005.
With respect to the effect of banking panics on the price level, then, the
appropriate conclusion appears to be that countries with banking panics did
not suffer worse deflation than those without panics;
2
4 however, it is possible
that U.S. banking panics in particular were an important source of world de-
flation during 1931-32, and thus, by extension, of world depression.
2.6 Conclusion
Monetary and financial arrangements in the interwar period were badly
flawed and were a major source of the fall in real output. Banking panics were
one mechanism through which deflation had its effects on real output, and
panics in the United States may have contributed to the severity of the world
deflation.
In this empirical study, we have focused on the effects of severe banking
panics. We believe it likely, however, that the effects of deflation on the finan-
cial system were not confined to these more extreme episodes. Even in coun-
tries without panics, banks were financially weakened and contracted their64 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
operations. Domestic debt deflation was probably a factor, to a greater or
lesser degree, in every country. And we have not addressed at all the effect of
deflation on the burden of external debt, which was important for a number of
countries. As we have already suggested, more careful study of these issues is
clearly desirable.
Notes
1. The original diagnosis of the Depression as a monetary phenomenon was of
course made in Friedman and Schwartz (1963). We find the more recent work, though
focusing to a greater degree on international aspects of the problem, to be essentially
complementary to the Friedman-Schwartz analysis.
2. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) discuss several mechanisms and provide some
cross-country evidence, but their approach is somewhat informal and they do not con-
sider the relative importance of the different effects.
3. To be clear, gold inflows to France did increase the French monetary base di-
rectly, one for one; however, in the absence of supplementary open market purchases,
this implied a rising ratio of French gold reserves to monetary base. Together with the
very low value of the French money multiplier, this rising cover ratio meant that the
monetary expansion induced by gold flowing into France was far less significant than
the monetary contractions that this inflow induced elsewhere.
4. Temin (1989) suggests that German monetary policy provided yet another con-
tractionary impetus.
5. There remains the issue of whether the differences in timing of nations' departure
from the gold standard can be treated as exogenous. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985)
argue that exogeneity is a reasonable assumption, given the importance of individual
national experiences, institutions, and fortuitous events in the timing of each country's
decision to go off gold. Strong national differences in attitudes toward the gold stan-
dard (e.g., between the Gold Bloc and the Sterling Bloc) were remarkably persistent
in their influence on policy.
6. The countries in our sample are listed in table 2.1. We included countries for
which the League of Nations collected reasonably complete data on industrial produc-
tion, price levels, and money supplies (League of Nations' Monthly Bulletin of Statis-
tics and Yearbooks, various issues; see also League of Nations, Industrialization and
Foreign Trade, 1945). Latin America, however, was excluded because of concerns
about the data and our expectation that factors such as commodity prices would play a
more important role for these countries. However, see Campa (forthcoming) for evi-
dence that the gold standard transmitted deflation and depression to Latin America in a
manner very similar to that observed elsewhere.
7. We define abandonment of the gold standard broadly as occurring at the first date
in which a country imposes exchange controls, devalues, or suspends gold payments;
see table 2.1 for a list of dates. An objection to this definition is that some countries
continued to try to target their exchange rates at levels prescribed by the gold standard
even after "leaving" the gold standard by our criteria; Canada and Germany are two
examples. We made no attempt to account for this, on the grounds that defining adher-
ence to the gold standard by looking at variables such as exchange rates, money
growth, or prices risks assuming the propositions to be shown.
8. In constructing the grand averages taken over gold and non-gold countries, if a65 Financial Crisis in the Great Depression
country abandoned the gold standard in the middle of a year, it is included in both the
gold and non-gold categories with weights equal to the fraction of the year spent in
each category. We use simple rather than weighted averages in the tables, and similarly
give all countries equal weight in regression results presented below. This was done
because, for the purpose of testing hypotheses (e.g., about the relationship between
deflation and depression) it seems most reasonable to treat each country (with its own
currency, legal system, financial system, etc.) as the basic unit of observation and to
afford each observation equal weight. If we were instead trying to measure the overall
economic significance of, for example, an individual country's policy decisions,
weighted averages would be more appropriate.
9. The use of the terms Ml and M2 should not be taken too literally here, as the
transactions characteristics of the assets included in each category vary considerably
among countries. The key distinction between the two aggregates is that commercial
banks, which were heavily involved in commercial lending, were much more vulner-
able to banking panics. Savings banks, in contrast, held mostly government securities,
and thus often gained deposits during panic periods.
10. However, it must be mentioned that recent exponents of the real wage explana-
tion of German unemployment invoke it to account for high levels of unemployment
throughout the mid and late 1920s, and not just for the period after 1929 (Borchardt
1979).
11. In the French case, however, there may have been some fear of government
default, given the large deficits that were being run; conceivably, this could explain the
higher rate on French bills.
12. A possible response to this point is that fear of devaluation added a risk pre-
mium to assets in gold standard countries. This point can be checked by looking at
forward rates for foreign exchange, available in Einzig (1937). The forward premia on
gold standard currencies are generally small, except immediately before devaluations.
In particular, the three-month premium on dollars versus the pound in 1932 had a
maximum value of about 4.5% (at an annual rate) during the first week of June, but for
most of the year was considerably less than that.
13. The effect of deflation on banks, and the relationship between deflation and
bank runs, has been analyzed in a theoretical model by Flood and Garber (1981).
14. An important issue, which we cannot resolve here, is whether government take-
overs of banks resulted in some restoration of intermediary services, or if, instead, the
government functioned primarily as a liquidation agent.
15. In the next section we divide our sample into two groups: eleven countries with
serious banking problems and thirteen countries without these problems. In 1930, the
year before the peak of the banking crises, the countries that were to avoid banking
problems suffered on average a 12% deflation and a 6% fall in industrial production;
the comparable numbers for the group that was to experience panics were 13% and
8%. Thus, there was no large difference between the two groups early in the Depres-
sion. In contrast, in 1932 (the year following the most intense banking crises), indus-
trial production growth in countries without banking crises averaged -2%; in the
group that experienced crises the comparable number was — 16%.
16. Although this correlation seems to hold during the Depression, we do not want
to conclude unconditionally that branch banking is more stable; branching facilitates
diversification but also increases the risk that problems in a few large banks may bring
down the entire network.
17. Causality could run in both directions. For example, Wigmore (1987) argues
that the U.S. banking panic in 1933 was in part created by a run on the dollar.
18. It has been pointed out to us that if nominal wages were literally rigid, then this
approach would find no effect for wages even though changes in the real wage might66 Ben Bernanke and Harold James
be an important channel for the effects of deflation. The reply to this is that, if nominal
wages are completely rigid, the hypothesis that real wages are important can never be
distinguished from an alternative which proposes that deflation has its effects in some
other way.
19. In another sensitivity check, we also tried multiplying PANIC times the change
in the deposit-currency ratio, to allow for differential severity of panics. The results
exhibited an outlier problem. When Rumania (which had a change in the deposit-
currency ratio of — .76 in 1931) was excluded, the results were similar to those ob-
tained using the PANIC variable alone. However, inclusion of Rumania weakened both
the magnitude and statistical significance of the effect of panics on output. The "rea-
son" for this is that, despite its massive deposit contraction, Rumania experienced a
5% growth of industrial production in 1931. Whether this is a strong contradiction of
the view that panics affect real output is not clear, however, since according to the
League of Nations the peak of the Rumania crisis did not occur until September or
October, and industrial production in the subsequent year fell by 14%. Another reason
to downplay these results is that the change in the deposit-currency ratio may not be a
good indicator of the severity of the banking crisis, as the Italian case indicates.
20. Results were unchanged when lagged industrial production growth was added
to the equations. The coefficient on lagged production was typically small and statisti-
cally insignificant.
21. Deflation is by the wholesale price index.
22. A possible exception to this proposition for a small country might be a situation
in which there are fears that the country will devalue or abandon gold; in this case the
country's price level might drop below the world level without causing inflows of re-
serves. An example may be Poland in 1932. A member of the Gold Bloc, Poland's
wholesale price level closely tracked that of France until mid 1931, when Poland ex-
perienced severe banking problems and withdrawals of foreign deposits, which threat-
ened convertibility. From that point on, even though both countries remained on the
gold standard, money supplies and prices in Poland and France began to diverge. From
the time of the Polish crisis in June 1931 until the end of 1932, money and notes and
circulation dropped by 9.1% in Poland (compared to a gain of 10.5% in France); Polish
commercial bank deposits fell 24.5% (compared to a 4.1% decline in France); and
Polish wholesale prices declined 35.2% (compared to a decline of 18.3% in France).
Despite its greater deflation, Poland lost about a sixth of its gold reserves in 1932,
while France gained gold.
23. This hypothesis does not bear on Temin's claim that there was little that central
banks could do about banking crises under the gold standard; rather, the argument is
that if, fortuitously, French and U.S. banking panics had not occurred, world deflation
in 1931-32 would have been less severe.
24. Indeed, if banking panics induced countries to abandon gold, they may have
indirectly contributed to an eventual rise in price levels.
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